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CYPRUS

1959 - 1960

An Unfinished Story

Translated from the French
by Steve Dickinson



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The Center for Strategic and International Studies, a research institute based in Washington DC, recently published an important study about the significance of the religious factor in the resolution of conflicts.¹ Its authors make the point that both in policy analysis and policy-making, the relevance and role of religious or spiritual factors is usually not addressed. They therefore undertake to explore this role by means of a series of quite varied case studies spanning several continents. They assess how the involvement of churches, religious communities or spiritual movements contributed to conflict prevention, conflict resolution and post-conflict reconciliation. The case studies involve the Catholic Church, the churches of former East Germany, the Moravian Church, the Quakers...

Two of the eight cases addressed in their book deal with the work of Moral Re-Armament. These are the birth of Zimbabwe in 1979, and the very first chapters of the French-German reconciliation after the Second World War. One could cite others, including the independence of Cyprus. As elsewhere, the religious factor is not reported in the press at the time or in the work of historians since.

Admittedly, it is only one explanatory variable among others and it is rarely a visible one. The new attitudes born from changes in

¹ *Religion, the Missing Dimension of Statecraft*, edited by Douglas Johnston and Cynthia Sampson, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, (Oxford University Press, 1994).

the hearts of people and transmitted from person to person almost always escape the attention of the media.

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To trace the chain of contacts which affected some of the shapers of the events leading to Cyprus' independence in 1959-60, it is necessary to begin thirty-five years earlier. In 1924, Frank Buchman, the founder of Moral Re-Armament (a name adopted later), arrived in Turkey during a voyage to several countries which he and some friends were making. At Robert College, an American university in Istanbul, they spoke to the students. They taught them what it meant to listen to God in silence, and practiced this experience with them.

Twenty years later, one of these students, Georges Moïssidès, now a teacher at the American Academy of Larnaca in Cyprus, was continuing to practice this regular quiet time with God and teaching his own students how to do the same. His name and address were given to a young Moral Re-Armament worker, Bill Conner, who was at the moment stationed on the island. One day, Moïssidès decided to ask the Bishop of Kitium, the diocese where Larnaca was situated, whether he would support the efforts of Moral Re-Armament on Cyprus. The Bishop gave his blessing.

In 1950, this Bishop was made Archbishop and adopted the name of Makarios III, becoming by tradition both the leader of the Church and of the Greek people on Cyprus with the title of Ethnarc. He also became one of the leaders of the Greek nationalist movement, called Enosis, whose objective, the assimilation of Cyprus within Greece proper, would run into a growing resistance on the part of the Turkish Cypriot minority. At the time, however,

it was British colonial rule which confronted the Greek Cypriot leader. For London, Cyprus sovereignty had been decided. Colonial Minister John Dugdale said in the House of Commons in April 1950 that it had been clearly stated repeatedly that no change was under consideration in the Island's sovereignty. This policy was reaffirmed several times thereafter, notably by Prime Minister Anthony Eden in September 1953 when he refused to discuss the issue with the Greek Prime Minister, Marshall Papagos, and in a decisive manner by Colonial Minister Henry Hopkinson in a House of Commons debate on July 28, 1954. When Makarios visited London at that time, no member of the British government received him.

It was in this context that during a visit to England in the Fall of 1954, one of Makarios' advisors, a businessman named Nikos Dimitriou who had met Bill Conner through Moïssidès, encouraged Conner to meet the Archbishop in London. Conner and a friend, Lionel Jardine, visited the Archbishop in his hotel. The atmosphere was rather cool until Moral Re-Armament was mentioned. "Oh! Frank Buchman is a good friend," said one of the archbishop's staff. "I met him in 1936 in Berlin, when I was posted at the Greek embassy there." And he told what he had learned from that encounter. Shortly thereafter, in spite of a thick fog, Makarios visited Moral Re-Armament headquarters in London, at 45 Berkeley Square, in the company of Dr. Dervis, mayor of Nicosia, and of Mr. Spiro Kypriannou, his assistant who was later to become president of the Republic of Cyprus. There, he met with Generals George Channer and David Forster, drank tea, watched two films and was given a copy of *Remaking the World*, the collection of Frank Buchman's speeches, which he subsequently carried with him into

exile in the Seychelles, in March 1956.

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During the years of decolonization, it was often the case that official delegations at the UN would contain representatives of liberation movements. It was thus that Zenon Rossides came to New York as Makarios' representative during the years preceding the independence of Cyprus, as a participant in the Greek delegation to the UN General Assembly. So it was that one day in 1957, he was introduced by General Mian Hayaud Din, the Pakistani military attaché to the US, to two of his friends in Moral Re-Armament, Harry Almond and Matt Manson. He met them again on a weekend, and then attended a meeting of their movement on Mackinac Island on Lake Michigan.

Several months later, in November 1957, Bill Conner, Matt Manson and his wife Margie were in New York and invited Mr. Rossides and his wife for dinner. As they prepared for the evening, they had the clear thought not to talk about Cypriot independence but rather to concentrate on questions of personal character. The Mansons had just been through a difficult period. He had come to accept that he had been over-bearing with his wife in imposing his own will on her, and their marriage had gone through several crises as a result. He had recognized his full responsibility for this and had asked his wife for forgiveness. This became the subject of conversation with the Rossides.

The next day the phone rang. Zenon Rossides had spoken about the evening with Makarios, who was now also in New York. Harold Macmillan, having replaced Anthony Eden as Prime Minister, had authorized Makarios to leave his exile in the Seychelles but not yet

to return to Cyprus. Listening to Rossides, Makarios decided he wanted to meet Matt Manson and Bill Conner. They met the same day in the Ritz Hotel. The two British men first spoke about their time as army officers in Cyprus and said how much they regretted their behavior and that of their men. The Archbishop was visibly moved. Then Rossides asked them to repeat for Makarios what they had told him the night before about reflective listening and the possibility of being guided by God by this means. Makarios listened intently. They also read to him the thoughts they had written down that morning during their daily times of silent inner listening. Some had to do expressly with Cyprus: today a significant source of problems and tomorrow, why not a beacon of hope? Also the need for statesmen guided by God and the role that the Archbishop could play as an architect of peace and unity in the Eastern Mediterranean. "Do you really believe I could play such a role," asked the Archbishop? The two men gave him a small book in which he would find nurture for the experience of change for himself and to share with others, including Englishmen.²

Later Rossides confided that he had never seen Makarios so moved in the presence of strangers and that he was sure this meeting would be fruitful.

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Since the explosion in Cyprus of the first bombs of the EOKA, a military underground organization headed by Colonel Grivas, on April 1, 1955, the island had known alternating periods of violence and lull. A unilateral cease-fire announced by Grivas in March 1957

² *Remaking Men*, by Peter Howard and Paul Campbell, Blandford Press, London, 1954

led to the liberation of Makarios and resulted in nearly one year of relative peace for the inhabitants. But bombings began again in the spring of 1958 and became common towards the end of summer.

At the political level, the conflict was punctuated by the annual sessions of the General Assembly of the United Nations and by a series of plans elaborated by British authorities in London in their attempts to end the crisis: an internal autonomy plan, presented at the tripartite conference in London (1955), propositions submitted to Makarios by the Island's Governor, Mr. Harding (1955-56), the Radcliffe plan (1956-57), and the Macmillan plan (1958). This last plan, announced by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons in June 1958 and amended slightly in August, proposed a seven-year provisional government. Unlike the earlier Radcliffe plan which would have given the Turkish community a status of privileged minority, the Macmillan plan put both the Greek and Turkish communities more or less on an equal footing and it granted both a large degree of autonomy. Without going to the partition desired by the Turks, the plan went quite far in this direction and instituted what *The Times* called a "non-territorial partition" which could have led to the resettlement of populations.

Presented as "an adventure in partnership" the Macmillan Plan provided that Greece and Turkey would each assign a representative to work with the British governor. After seven years a shared sovereignty among the three countries on the island was envisaged, provided the UK would continue to occupy its military bases. Each community would have its own assembly, responsible for its affairs. The Governor could authorise the establishment of separate Greek and Turkish municipal councils in certain cities. Ministers elected by

the two chambers (four Greeks and two Turks) would only meet together, presided over by the Governor, to deal with interior administrative issues involving both communities and of course not including matters reserved to the Governor himself (foreign affairs, defense, security).

Received favourably in Great Britain and with only some small tactical reservations by Turkey, the plan raised vehement protests from Greece and a violent reaction from Greek Cypriots. The renewed violence of August 1958 was also in response to it. The autumn of that year was one of the most bloody periods of the conflict. The higher point of this new wave of terrorism and repression was the assassination, on October 3, of the wife of a British sergeant outside a store and the massive and brutal crackdown which followed.³

Shortly thereafter British journalist Ken Mackenzie, who had recently become chief editor of the *Cyprus Mail*, telephoned Peter Howard, himself a former journalist and one of the leaders of Moral Re-Armament, and told him the situation was becoming unbearable.⁴ Ledra Street, where he lived, had become the scene of such frequent bomb attacks that people were calling it *the murder mile*. "Passions are running high," he said, "and people are no longer in control of themselves. Please see if you can do something to help us."

Peter Howard prayed and reflected together with his wife Doë who happened to be of Greek origin. They both had the strong sense

³ *The Cyprus Revolt*, by Nancy Crawshaw (George Allen & Unwin, London, 1978) p.319 & following.

⁴ The life of Peter Howard is retraced in *Peter Howard Life and Letters*, by Anne Wolrige Gordon, Hodder & Stoughton, London, 1969.

that Cyprus should become an absolute priority for them. People were wondering just how far the violence would go. The day after the murder of two English bank directors, shot dead from behind outside their offices, one in Limassol and the other the next day in Nicosia, the authorities announced that all British civilians who so wished would be authorized to carry arms and that the Army, if necessary, would teach them how to use them.⁵ The Howards decided to invite Ken Mackenzie to meet them in London, which he did after visiting Sir Hugh Foot, the governor of Cyprus, and stopping in Athens to see Bishop Makarios. Then the Howards put on a dinner party at 45 Berkeley Square where they brought together some forty political, economic, diplomatic and religious figures, including one of Doë Howard's cousins named Marino Cosmetato, a diplomat at the Greek embassy. Ken Mackenzie reported on the situation in Cyprus, including the public mood on the island, without failing to mention the responsibility of newspapers like his own. Toward the end of the meal and once everyone had spoken, Peter Howard invited the group to observe a moment of silence, in the hope that one or another of the guests would get some thought for the future of the island. In those brief moments one of the participants, Conservative member of Parliament Sir Hamilton Kerr, who was close to the Prime Minister, felt something he had never been conscious of before: hatred for the Greeks because of their attitude on the island. He revealed his thoughts to the assembled guests and apologised to the Greek diplomat, who was visibly touched.

⁵ Press conference given by Major General Darling, director of operations (*The Times*, November 10, 1958).

Moral Re-Armament was not unknown to Sir Hamilton Kerr. During Easter of that year, he had visited its center in Caux, Switzerland, near Montreux, with two colleagues, one from the Conservative Party like himself, Major Henry Spencer, and John McGovern from the Labour Party. Upon their return to London all three of them decided to ask the Prime Minister for a meeting to speak to him about what they had discovered there. According to McGovern, Harold Macmillan received them instantly and listened to them attentively for forty-five minutes.⁶ McGovern and Kerr were later to each have a part in diffusing the crisis in Cyprus.

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A decisive step in the evolution of the conflict took place at the General Assembly of the UN in the autumn of 1958. The odds of achieving reintegration of the island with Greece were quite unfavourable and the Greek government had decided to advocate independence, for which Makarios became the public spokesman in an interview on September 21st. This solution implied a double renunciation: Enosis for the Greeks and partition for the Turks. The British, wishing to have the Macmillan plan approved, launched under the auspices of NATO a tripartite British-Greek-Turkish negotiation which, however, faltered in October. Yet their position prevailed with the political commission, which adopted on December 4 an Iranian resolution inspired by London.

That very evening, a direct conversation took place between the Greek and Turkish foreign-affairs ministers Averoff and Zorlu. For his part, the British Ambassador to the United Nations, Sir Pierson

⁶ *Neither Fear nor Favour*, by John McGovern (Blandford Press, London, 1960), chapter 23.

Dixon, had the thought: "What we need today is not a victory but a success." He realized that he should not try to push his advantage. The next day the UN General Assembly was presented with a new text which had been "negotiated by all the parties directly interested". It expressed confidence that the parties would continue their efforts "to reach a peaceful democratic and just resolution in accordance with the Charter". This text meant that there were to be no victors or vanquished, and it encouraged, without stating it, Zorlu and Averoff to begin bilateral negotiations, which started in Paris on December 15th, parallel to a meeting of the NATO Council of Ministers, and continued in January 1959, on the occasion of a meeting of the OECD.

Meanwhile, in the first few days of 1959, John McGovern and his wife were passing through New York on their way to a conference of Moral Re-Armament in Los Angeles. Although they were due to catch a connecting flight the same day, McGovern had a sense that they should not rush. Fortuitously, towards the end of the afternoon, he learned that Makarios and Rossides were in the city, and he immediately thought he should ask for an appointment. He went to see the Archbishop the next morning at the St.Moritz Hotel, together with Harry Almond, Bill Conner and two or three others.

McGovern did not introduce himself as a representative of a country or a party, but as one who had learned to consider things in a new light. He warned the Archbishop about some members of the Labour Party who were trying to exploit the Cyprus questions for domestic political ends, and who were predicting the imminent return of their party to power and the full resolution of the conflict

on Greek terms, including Enosis. McGovern strongly doubted either of those two developments would take place. His fear was that the Macmillan plan would be adopted and that in order to implement it over the strong opposition to it in Cyprus, the British government would feel obliged to send more troops to the island, in addition to the economic harm he believed the plan would provoke.

McGovern did not conceal from his interlocutor that, as a British parliamentarian, he could not accept Eoka's terrorism through which his countrymen and innocent civilians, women and children, were dying. The British public, he added, did not understand how a prelate could condone armed rebellion. Lastly, he referred to his meeting with Macmillan a few months prior in order to suggest that the Archbishop renounce violence and open discussions with the Prime Minister in the spirit of Moral Re-Armament.

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Invited by McGovern to go to the Los Angeles Conference, the Archbishop accepted immediately. But the King of Greece called him to Athens and he had to leave. So he suggested that Rossides go to Los Angeles in his place. He and his wife were invited, but Rossides remained hesitant. Sensing that this indecision was a question of money, an American businessman, a friend of Harry Almond, offered a return air ticket to the couple.

In Los Angeles the Rossides had long conversations with the McGoverns and the Howards. One morning at breakfast Zenon Rossides expressed his strong resentment of the British. His wife, Theresa, intervened at this point to say that she often felt treated by him with the same sense of cold superiority which he was accusing the British of showing toward him. This shocked him so much he

left the table. But it was a turning point. He realized he had to start with an effort in his own life if he wanted to find a resolution that could succeed and that others would accept. This caused him to reconsider his attitudes towards the British and the Turks, and with his spirit and mind freed from the resentments he had carried, he became receptive to new inspirations. He began to start his days in Los Angeles with times of quiet reflexion. During one of these morning times of silence, he wrote, "Not what the Greeks want, nor the Turks, nor the British, but what is just." Following this, he wrote down several points which he thought might serve as the basis for an eventual settlement.

Rossides also had the thought that he would be ready in this new spirit to meet with Harold Macmillan, whom he had come to know in Athens during the war but whom he had hated since the Cyprus confrontation. Peter Howard then phoned Sir Hamilton Kerr in London who, since the breakfast in Berkeley Square, had expressed an eagerness to be of help. The Prime Minister's cabinet sent back a positive response. This was a new situation. Rossides had never been received officially anywhere in Britain. Why this sudden change? It seems above all that the British Cabinet did not want to be blamed later for having missed any possible chance to put an end to the terrorism on the island.⁷

The message did specify, however, that the meeting with the Prime Minister would take place if something new was put on the table and if Macmillan was in London at that time. Otherwise,

⁷ A letter of January 20, 1964, from Frederick A. Bishop, principle private secretary of the Prime Minister, to J.O. Moreton, Esq., M.C., Minister for the Colonies.

another government member would meet Rossides. The latter took this as a slight, quite wrongly, as it was later shown by a document kept in the British Public Records Office. A note which mentions a possible meeting between Rossides and "a member of the Government" is corrected by Macmillan's own hand into "the Prime Minister or a member of the Government". In any event, Rossides refused to go to London and said he was returning to Athens. His companions in Los Angeles did not succeed in convincing him otherwise. In New York, Harry Almond offered to drive him to the airport. Rossides declined, saying he was being looked after by friends. In fact, he was departing neither to London nor directly to Athens but to Geneva.

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At that time, Margie Manson was in the MRA Center at Caux-sur-Montreux and was due to take a plane from Geneva to Paris. While the train taking her to Geneva was at its regular stop in Lausanne, the arrival from Bern of the express train to Geneva was announced. She had no reason to change to the faster train, as hers would arrive in ample time for her flight but suddenly, one of those inner injunctions which she had learned to recognize told her to take the non-stop to Geneva. One could discuss forever whether this was indeed an intuition or simply a fortuitous coincidence. The fact is that Margie Manson raced to get on the express train just in time and upon arriving much earlier in Geneva found herself face to face with Mr and Mrs Rossides just arriving from the United States. As no one was in a hurry, they sat down for a cup of coffee and to exchange news. The Rossides told her how the British Government, faithful to its habit, was accepting a dialogue in principle while

evading it in practice. They were planning to stay two days at the Hotel des Familles in Geneva, for a medical appointment, before returning to Athens.

That evening, having reached Paris, Margie Manson had dinner at the Moral Re-Armament Center at Boulogne-Billancourt and mentioned her encounter with the Rossides. Archie Mackenzie, a British diplomat and brother of Ken Mackenzie who lived in the house, jumped on the telephone. He knew that Sir Hamilton Kerr was in London desperately trying to contact Rossides. The Prime Minister, far from evading a meeting, had asked again when Rossides would come and see him.

The following day, Bill Conner undertook to fly to Geneva to convince Rossides that Macmillan truly wished to receive him. After two or three days of hesitation, Rossides accepted to go to London. The meeting was organized with great discretion and secrecy. On February 2, at 11 a.m., Rossides entered the Prime Minister's office through the garden door of 10 Downing Street.

The atmosphere was rather cool at first, according to Philip de Zulueta, diplomatic adviser to the Prime Minister, who was there to write a report of the meeting.⁸ But it was not long before it warmed up. Rossides expressed deep regret for the excesses committed by his Greek compatriots on the island, and particularly for the British victims of assassinations. He also responded to the Prime Minister's many questions about the Los Angeles conference. In fact this topic continued so long that Zulueta began to wonder if there would be

⁸ This report is on file at the Public Records Office. It is confirmed by a private report written by Bill Conner, who picked up Rossides at the conclusion of the meeting.

time enough left to discuss the main purpose of the meeting.

Rossides returned to it. He underlined the importance of finding an equitable solution capable of uniting the inhabitants of the island, which, in his judgment, would not be achieved with the seven year plan proposed by the Prime Minister. The island should become an independent country whether or not a member of the British Commonwealth. Greeks and Turks should work together based on their political allegiance, not on their belonging to one or the other community. This would be enhanced in his view by an unicameral legislature with members elected from mixed lists of candidates from the two communities, so that the elected representatives from one community would in part depend on the votes of the other. The Prime Minister expressed his satisfaction at what was said about the cooperation of all parties. This was, according to him, the basis of the British plans. The separate assemblies envisaged in his interim plan, he said, were conceived only to handle matters specific to each community. He recalled that the Radcliffe plan, rejected by the Greeks, tended to consider the island as a whole.⁹ He indicated that the British were trying to avoid both Enosis and partition. It is definitely difficult to find unity, he added, but the important thing is to have faith.

Rossides expressed his desire that military operations be brought to an end, asked about the conditions of a return of the

⁹ In fact what disturbed the Greeks was less the Radcliffe Plan itself than the manner in which the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Alan Lennox-Boyd, presented it to the House of Commons, explaining that every application of self-determination should permit the two communities, each acting of course separately, to decide their future status, and that the partition of the island should be one of the options offered.

Archbishop to the island and suggested a general amnesty. He then asked Macmillan what message he should take back with him. According to what Rossides reported to his friends right after the meeting, the Prime Minister replied, "A message of hope and faith based on the spirit which you brought with you in coming this morning." Macmillan concluded that the British Government had no other wishes than to find an agreement acceptable to all parties, the only sort of agreement of any value. And in fact, when Macmillan was told that Averoff and Zorlu were suggesting establishing together the basis of an agreement - in which UK sovereignty would be maintained over British military basis on the island - and moving on to tripartite negotiations, he approved of this "encouraging and unexpected" development.¹⁰

That very evening after the meeting in Downing Street Zenon Rossides flew back to Athens. There, he just had time to brief Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis who was on his way to Zurich to continue with his Turkish counterparts the bilateral negotiations started by the two foreign affairs ministers.

In Athens Rossides also met Ahmed Emin Yalman, chief editor of an important newspaper in Istanbul, *Vatan* (Fatherland). Yalman was also convinced about Moral Re-Armament work and had become one of its spokesmen in his country. On the Cypriot question his articles were not written solely for or in support of the Turkish community. He also tried to influence Greek public opinion toward resolution of the question and thus wrote columns in Greek newspapers as well in Athens and Nicosia. Just before the

¹⁰ *Riding the Storm (1956-1959)*, by Harold Macmillan (Macmillan, London, 1971), p. 689

conference in Zurich, he wrote in the Greek daily newspaper, *Vima*, an article entitled *Our common destiny*.¹¹ "Greece and Turkey, " he wrote, "have a common destiny. They are condemned by geopolitical factors and historical developments to be either good neighbours, close friends, faithful allies - or to commit suicide jointly... It is up to us now to perform the miracle of changing Cyprus to become a link between us, instead of a separating issue." Recognizing the negative role which the press had played with regard to the relations of the two countries, he invited journalists to create a favourable climate within which formulas to resolve outstanding issues could be found, and to ensure that the conflict's resolution would escape the influence of considerations of domestic politics on both sides. After the agreement he continued to argue for close Greco-Turk cooperation.¹² He would write later how he had been led to write these articles after having met in Caux industrialists and miners from the Ruhr who had found unity. He had not believed his eyes and had gone to Germany to verify it. In seeing for himself that there was an answer to class struggle, he had come to believe that there must also be a solution to the hate which existed in the Cyprus conflict.¹³ Later, the London *Times* paid homage to his work.¹⁴

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¹¹ January 25, 1959.

¹² See especially the statement by Yalman in the *Times of Cyprus*, on page 1 of the issue of July 20, 1959 under the title, *Preserve the miracle*.

¹³ Statement made at Caux on September 20, 1959.

¹⁴ *The Times*, March 8, 1960: "Probably no Turk has achieved more respect among all communities during recent years in Cyprus than Mr Yalman. His moderate and conciliatory writings on the Cyprus question and Greco-Turkish relations, are considered to have helped create the atmosphere which made the Zurich settlement possible."

Cypriot leaders were not invited to the Zurich conference, only the Prime Ministers and Foreign Affairs Ministers of Greece and Turkey along with their staffs. The conference opened February 6th, 1959 and proceeded laboriously. The Turkish delegation was very insistent and obtained important concessions which permitted the conference to conclude. But the approval of the other concerned parties was still needed. London raised no objections as long as its concerns over military bases were fully addressed. The support of the Turkish Cypriots for the positions of Ankara was not in doubt, so this left only the Greek Cypriots.

When they convened a conference of the three governments plus Archbishop Makarios and Dr. Kutchuk representing the two Cypriot communities in a round table format in London on February 17th, the British authorities expected that the Zurich compromise would be adopted without any renegotiations. It is well known that with the exception of the plane accident which nearly killed the Turkish Prime Minister, Adnan Menderes, the London conference was remembered mainly for the great reluctance of Makarios to sign the document presented to him. The modifications he asked for were rejected by all, including Caramanlis, the Greek Prime Minister. Asked on the afternoon of February 18 by the British Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Selwyn Loyd, to make his position known without further delay, Makarios answered that it would be negative unless he were given more time. He thus obtained an extension until the middle of the next morning.

What happened that night, and what was it after all the hesitations which moved Makarios toward acceptance of the agreement? The current president of the Republic of Cyprus,

Glafcos Clerides, who was a member of the large delegation with the Archbishop in London, asks himself that question at some length in his book, *My Deposition*.¹⁵ His belief is that Makarios never intended to refuse to sign but that he held out in every way he could in the hope of obtaining last minute modifications in an agreement he considered very flawed. He finally accepted to sign - and there is scarcely any doubt about this - only to avoid the application of the Macmillan Plan.

Others do not exclude the possibility that the Archbishop, as he himself said, was really uncertain what his final response should be, and that he made his decision after "a night of prayer and reflection over this anguishing dilemma which confronted him."¹⁶ Harold Macmillan might well have had this view.¹⁷ One must keep in mind the lack of enthusiasm that existed among the assistants of Makarios for the results of the Zurich meetings, the extreme reticence of Colonel Grivas, who was not present in London, and the uneasiness

¹⁵ *My Deposition*, by Glafcos Clerides (Alithia, Nicosia, 1989) vol. 1, p. 71 & following.

¹⁶ *The Daily Telegraph*, February 20, 1959.

¹⁷ In his book, *A Start in Freedom* (Hodder & Stoughton, London 1964), the Governor of Cyprus, Sir Hugh Foot, describes how the Prime Minister called him in the day after the conclusion of the agreement, recalled with him the experiences in the crisis they had just passed through and then asked him just as he was leaving, "if he had ever had the feeling, during all these strange events, that sometimes there had been the intervention of divine providence". (Chapter IX, p. 157). The Governor asks himself the same question as he recalls how he was spared having to order the execution of two terrorists. There was nothing to justify sparing them, but the hanging would strongly risk compromising the peaceful settlement barely underway. A phone call from the Secretary of State for the Colonies just before midnight brought the news that Zorlu and Averoff had reached a joint agreement that the execution should not take place. The hanging had been set for fifteen minutes past midnight! (Ibid. p.177-80).

about how the accord would be received by the people of Cyprus.

One precise fact tends to corroborate this second assessment. On the morning of February 19th, at 5:45, Bill Conner got a phone call from Rossides who said that neither Makarios nor himself had slept that night. Could he come join them at the Dorchester Hotel? Conner went at once together with a friend, Dr. David Watson. They found Rossides in an agitated state, pacing and very disconcerted. There was a typewriter in the room and in it a sheet of paper with an unfinished rejection of the agreement. The phone was ringing off the hook, with journalists growing impatient and wanting to know what decision the Archbishop had finally come to. Makarios was in a second room adjoining the first.

One of the visitors took charge of the phone and the typing. To all callers, irrespective of rank, the same answer was given: the two Cypriots were not available. Rossides was thus able to concentrate his thoughts again. The two guests did not try to influence him either way, only to support his conviction that a solution had to be just. They prayed with him that in the decision-making all fear would be banished, which in the climate of insecurity which existed in Cyprus at that time was very concrete and tangible. Soon, the atmosphere in the room was transformed. At one point Rossides went into the next room to see the Archbishop. After a short while, he came back and announced that Makarios had decided to sign the agreement, that he was at peace with this course of action and was confident that the news would be well received.

In announcing his decision, the Archbishop exhorted his friends to work for unity with the Turkish Cypriots. And on the occasion of his triumphal return to Nicosia, after almost three years of exile,

he renewed his call: "Especially let us cooperate wholeheartedly and sincerely with our friends from the Turkish community."¹⁸

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Relating facts whose authenticity has been verified is one thing; assessing the importance of one factor or another in the resolution of a conflict is more difficult. Did the spirit of Moral Re-Armament, which without question inspired the behaviour of several key participants, in the end actually shape the course of events? One answer is to cite the statement of appreciation of the two Cypriot leaders.

A message from Archbishop Makarios, read at the conference in Caux on August 4, 1959, stated: "We had the opportunity to follow closely the work of Moral Re-Armament and particularly to appreciate its endeavours and its contribution to the solution of the Cyprus problem." According to a press report from Nicosia dated November 3, 1959, the Archbishop said to a visiting group from this movement whom he was receiving: "On this occasion I want to express my thanks for your contribution to the solution of the Cyprus question. I know how Moral Re-Armament was and is interested in this question." The Archbishop on several later occasions renewed the expression of his gratitude: inviting Frank Buchman to come to Cyprus in January 1960, and then again in a message addressed to him on September 3rd of that same year.

Dr. Kutchuk declared on December 19th, 1959: "I remind all that Moral Re-Armament played an important part in the solution of the Cyprus problem." Just over two years later, in a message sent April 21, 1962, to a meeting of the movement in Strasbourg, he

¹⁸ *Cyprus Mail*, March 2, 1959.

wrote: "The principles of MRA constitute the basis of the London and Zurich agreements and of the Cyprus constitution. They have enabled Greeks and Turks to forget the antagonism which existed between them in the past and have provided the ground for a spirit of friendly co-operation and mutual respect toward each other's right. The valuable efforts exerted by Moral Re-Armament in changing the leaders and people of Cyprus and helping them to become free of hatred and revenge have already started to bear fruit."

At the same time Rossides, having become Cyprus' Ambassador to the United Nations, declared: "If there is a case where the spirit of Moral Re-Armament has worked successfully, it is certainly the case of Cyprus. Indeed, it is that spirit that brought about the settlement, in a case that seemed hopeless of solution, even by force."

Another symbol is the flag of the new Republic, donated to the center in Caux and raised on August 16th, 1960, the day of the declaration of independence, in the presence of representatives of the two communities. More striking still was the presence in Caux one year earlier of Zenon Rossides and Rauf Denktash, adviser to Fazil Kutchuk, speaking together on the same pannel a few months after having come to blows on American television.¹⁹ "I shouted at him," said Denktash, "grabbed him and tried to hit him. In my heart I was a beast - not a hero, not a man. Today I apologise." Responding, Rossides said: "I am very moved. It does not matter who was right or wrong in the past - we must get rid of our righteousness." Both agreed on the importance of considering themselves Cypriot first and Greek or Turkish second. Denktash said, "We must sacrifice many

¹⁹ New York, November 1958.

things we vowed to cling to forever."²⁰ A few days later, the correspondent of *The Times* of London in Nicosia stressed "the new quality of statesmanship displayed recently by Mr. Denktash" in an article presenting a lucid analysis of the sources of opposition between Greeks and Turks on the island. "At the root of the communal problems is the Greeks' assumption that they are morally, as well as culturally and socially, a superior race," he wrote, "the inevitable corollary of the cult of Hellenism, which is now being drilled into Greek schoolchildren more assiduously than ever... At the bottom of the Turk's relentless drive for virtual apartheid in economic and municipal affairs is the deep-rooted resentment at being looked down on by the Greeks."²¹

Nothing is won for ever. We know that very soon following the signature of the agreement, the situation started to deteriorate again. The Greek Cypriots showed a lack of goodwill and generosity toward the Turkish minority, not really accepting the disproportionate influence given to the Turks. One group refused to abandon the dream of Enosis, which created tensions within their own community. At the same time, nationalist sentiments and temptations towards partitioning the island developed among the Turkish Cypriots, who were prone to make excessive use of their constitutional prerogatives haunted as they were by the fear of marginalization. Britain's disengagement and the greater involvement of the Greek and Turkish governments did the rest. Tensions, then violence increased again, leading to the Turkish invasion of 1974 and the proclamation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in

²⁰ Caux Press release of August 5, 1959

²¹ *The Times*, August 11, 1959.

forty percent of the territory, recognized only by Turkey.

At the time of writing, thirty-five years after the Zurich and London agreements and thirty years after the arrival of the first UN peace-keeping troops, negotiations between the two communities have started again, under the auspices of the United Nations, around two specific proposals: the re-opening of the Nicosia airport to the benefit of the Turkish Cypriots, and the administration by the United Nations of the deserted city of Varocha, near Famagusta, to allow for the return there of several thousand Greek Cypriots. These measures have been agreed to in principle by both sides, but negotiations are stalling on practical details. In spite of the modesty of the stakes, discussions have been drawn out for several months and their conclusion is not yet in sight.

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